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Abstract: This study empirically investigates the simultaneity between leverage and debt maturity policies and the 
factors that influences them by using a simultaneous equation framework in which leverage and debt maturity are 
endogenous variables. Based on a panel data of 788 non-financial firms listed on Bursa Malaysia from 1999 until 
2010. The simultaneity between leverage and debt maturity is tested by utilizing a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression model. The results of this study show that leverage and debt maturity policies have a negative 
simultaneous relationship which indicates that there are strategic complementarities between leverage and maturity. 
This study also documents different results among the exogenous variables in both equations, in which growth 
opportunities, regulation, firm size, profitability and tangibility lend considerable support to the proposed 
hypotheses on the leverage equation. Meanwhile, firm size, regulation, abnormal earnings and tangibility are found 
to have significant effects on the debt maturity equation. 
 
Keywords: simultaneity, capital structure, debt maturity. 
 
 
Abstrak : Penelitian ini secara empiris menyelidiki simultanitas antara leverage dan maturitas hutang serta faktor – 
faktor yang mempengaruhinya dengan menggunakan kerangka persamaan simultan yang mana leverage dan 
maturitas hutang adalah variabel endogen. Berdasarkan data panel terdapat 788 perusahaan terdaftar di Bursa 
Malaysia dari tahun 1999 sampai dengan 2010, tidak termasuk perusahaan yang bergerak di industri keuangan. 
Simultanitas antara leverage dan maturitas hutang diuji dengan menggunakan regresi model two stage least squares 
(2SLS).  Hasil dari penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa leverage dan maturitas hutang memiliki hubungan simultanitas 
negatif yang menunjukkan  bahwa terdapat hubungan yang komplementer anatara leverage dan maturitas hutang. 
Penelitian ini juga menunjukkan hasil yang berbeda antara variable eksogen dalam kedua persamaan tersebut, yang 
mana growth opportunities, regulation, firm size, profitability, dan tangibility memberikan dukungan yang penuh 
terhadap hipotesis yang diajukkan pada persamaan leverage. Disisi lain pula, firm size, regulation, abnormal return, 
dan tangibility ditemukan memiliki pengaruh yang signifikan terhadap persamaan maturitas.  
 
Kata kunci : simultanitas, struktur modal, maturitas hutang. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In principle, every company needs funding 
and the fulfillment of these funds may come from 
internal sources or external sources. The selection 
of the financial structure is a matter which concerns 
the composition of funding that will be used by a 
company. This will then determine how much debt 
will be incurred to finance its assets. 
 
Capital structure which forms the basis 
for permanent funding consists of long-term 
debt, preferred stock and shareholders’ equity. 
The basic element of a corporate financial policy 
includes the choice of debt level and also the 
structure of debt maturity (Barclay, Marx, & 
Smith, 2003). Barclay and Smith (1995) suggest 
that when firms choose debt as a source of 
funding, they should also consider other financial 
factors such as debt maturity, priority and 
whether to use public debt or private debt. 
Barclay et al. (2003) further postulate that when 
it comes to funding, other factors often occur 
simultaneously. 
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Leverage and debt maturity are the twin 
dimensions that cannot be separated from the 
corporate capital structure, in other words, when a 
firm issues new debt, it needs to decide the period 
of maturity and the size of the debt level 
concurrently (Elyasiani, Guo, & Tang, 2002). In 
addition, Barclay and Smith (1995) assert that 
when firms choose debt as a source of funding, 
they also need to consider the maturity of debt 
because the selection of debt maturity will affect 
the value of the firm. In essence, these studies 
contend that the choice of debt policy and debt 
maturity structure should be considered 
simultaneously. 
 
Barclay, Marx, and Smith (1997) is the 
pioneering study in examining the simultaneity 
between the policies on leverage and debt maturity 
among U.S. firms based on a simultaneous 
equations framework. Their findings reveal 
strategic complementarities between maturity and 
leverage. Using a different system of simultaneous 
equations, Barclay et al. (2003) show that although 
leverage and maturity are strongly correlated in 
terms of both unconditional and conditional 
correlations, there is evidence that both leverage 
and debt maturity are not complements. They, 
however, note that their model is possibly 
misspecified. Stohs and Mauer (1996) argue the 
findings by Barclay and Smith (1995) on the 
relationship between debt maturity and growth 
opportunities are misspecified because they do not 
control the differences in leverage in their ordinary 
least squares (OLS) debt maturity regression. 
When Stohs and Mauer (1996) add leverage to the 
right hand side of their debt maturity regression, 
they discover that coefficient on the growth 
opportunities variable has a statistically significant 
positive relationship. 
 
Therefore, it is improper to take one as 
predeterminant when analyzing how firms choose 
the other. The coefficients estimated in the OLS 
regression of debt maturity model on the leverage 
and others variables will suffer from simultaneous 
equation bias (Barclay et al., 2003).  
 
Even though, Barclay et al. (2003) find that 
the coefficient on debt maturity in the leverage 
regression and the coefficient on leverage in the 
debt maturity regression have a different sign 
which indicate that leverage and debt maturity are 
not complementary to each other, but they believe 
that leverage and debt maturity are strongly 
correlated to each others. Elyasiani et al. (2002) 
and Sunarsih (2004) suggest a positive relationship 
between leverage and maturity, implying leverage 
and maturity are complementary to each other and 
there is simultaneity between leverage and debt 
maturity policies. Johnson (2003), however, finds a 
negative relationship between leverage and short-
term debt. 
 
Other subsequent empirical studies by 
Elyasiani et al. (2002), Johnson (2003), Sunarsih 
(2004) and Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) provide 
evidences of strategic complementarities between 
leverage and maturity. Based on these models of 
simultaneous equations framework, this study 
attempts to examine the simultaneity between the 
policies on leverage and debt maturity among 
Malaysian public-listed firms during the period 
from 1999 to 2010. 
 
The remaining of this study is structured as 
follows: the next section presents the reviews of 
theoretical literatures and past empirical studies. 
Thereafter, the research framework and hypothesis, 
which are constructed from the formulated 
research, are presented in section three, while 
section four discusses the empirical findings and 
provides the potential explanation of the results. 
Finally last section will concludes the overall 
research with some suggestions for further research 
in this field. 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL LITERATURE AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
This part discusses the relationship 
between the control variables on leverage and debt 
maturity. This will enable conclusions to be made 
on the influences of each variable on the leverage 
and debt maturity. This part also tests the 
hypothesis formulated for each variable. 
 
In this study, Johnson (2003) argues that 
there exists a positive relationship between 
Forum Bisnis Dan Kewirausahaan 
Jurnal Ilmiah STIE MDP 
Hal - 3 Vol. 2 No. 1 September 2012 
leverage and longer term debt maturity. These 
simultaneous equation results are consistent with 
the single equation model done by Barclay and 
Smith (1995) who find that firms with longer 
maturity have higher leverage. The relationship is 
also consistent with Stohs and Mauer (1996) and 
Barclay et al. (1997) that find negative relationship 
between leverage and short-term maturity or 
positive relationship between leverage and long-
term maturity.  
 
For others explanatory variables there have 
been a great deal of research into both capital 
structure theory and debt maturity theory, but 
relatively little into how the two theories may relate 
to each other. In order to lay a theoretical 
framework for this study, a review of capital 
structure theory and debt maturity theory literature 
should be done independently. These studies also 
explore how and why existing researches suggest 
that there might be a link between the two proxies. 
 
2.1. Theoretical Literature Under Leverage 
 
Theoretical researches generally suggest 
that leverage is significantly positive to growth 
opportunities. According to signaling theory, high 
performing firms are capable of using more 
leverage financing since leverage has its dead 
weight costs, which make less valuable firms more 
likely to fall into bankruptcy (Chen, 2004). The 
signaling theory predicts that firms with higher 
earnings with good growth prospect will use higher 
leverage.  
 
Several studies have been conducted to 
determine whether there is a relationship between 
leverage and firm size. Titman and Wessels (1998), 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) and Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) argue that the possibility of a large 
company that went bankrupt is small, so size has a 
positive effect on the level of debt taken.  
 
Elyasiani et al. (2002) state that if firms 
with NOLs have low tax benefits of debt, a 
negative relationship can be expected between 
NOLs and leverage. Firms with higher net 
operating loss will have lower leverage to enable 
them to manage their debt and pay it on time. 
Generally, leverage is negatively correlated to 
NOLs dummy. This is a direct implication of the 
trade-off theory of Deangelo and Masulis (1980). 
 
Capital structure also plays an important 
role in assessing regulation due to the interaction 
between the investment and financial decisions of a 
regulated firm and also the pricing choices of 
regulators (Spigel&Spulber, 1994). A number of 
studies suggest that rate regulation creates an 
incentive for regulated firms to increase their level 
of debt and there exists a positive relationship 
between regulated firms and leverage. 
 
This study also looks at the relationship 
between the signaling effects of debt by using the 
abnormal earnings as a proxy of signaling effect. 
According to signaling theory, firms with higher 
returns always optimize their leverage because 
higher returns always give positive signal to the 
market (Flannery, 1986 & Diamond, 1993). 
Optimism of companies about the future will be 
indicated by an increase in the stock price.  
 
 According to the pecking order theory, 
profitability negatively affects leverage (Myers, 
1977). This is supported by Megginson (1997) who 
suggests the tendency of profitable firms to have an 
inverse relation with leverage. In other words, 
firms which are profitable tend to have smaller 
amount of loans. Furthermore, this is in line with 
Titman and Wessels (1988) and Fama and French 
(2002) who find a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage.  
 
 The literatures on the relationship between 
tangibility and leverage suggest that tangibility is 
positively related to leverage. If a firm has higher 
asset tangibility, then these assets can be used as 
collateral, reducing the risk faced by lender such as 
suffering from agency cost of debt. Therefore, high 
leverage is expected to be associated with high 
fraction of tangible assets. In the case of 
bankruptcy, the expected value of tangible assets 
should be higher than intangible assets. Harris and 
Raviv (1990) suggest that leverage should increase 
with liquidation value and this is supported by 
Barclay et al. (2003). Both of them suggest that 
tangibility is positively related to leverage.  
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2.2. Theoretical Literature Under Debt Maturity 
 
 In general, firms with higher growth 
opportunities prefer to use smaller proportion of 
long-term debt whereby they control their 
underinvestment activities and agency cost through 
short-term debt (Myers, 1977 &Ozkan, 2002). 
Their finding was consistent with Arslan and Karan 
(2006) whereby the coefficient was negatively 
significant in their study. They state that firms with 
greater growth opportunities prefer to use shorter 
maturity to solve the underinvestment problem. 
Leland and Thoft (1996) show that the optimal 
capital structure of a firm also depends on debt 
maturity and it is lower when the firm is financed 
by short-term debt. 
 
 Marsh (1982) finds that firms with larger 
size more often choose long-term debt maturity, 
whereas small firms will choose short-term debt. 
Bevan and Danbolt (2000) in their research 
document a positive effect of firm size on debt 
maturity. Thus, small firms are expected to use less 
long-term debt than the larger firms. Titman and 
Wessels (1998) state that the possibility of large 
companies getting into bankruptcy is small and 
thus, it can positively affect the level of debt taken 
by the companies. Large firms, in general, tend to 
have more stable cash flows and more diversified 
assets. This means that large companies will use 
long-term debt more than small companies do. The 
latter prefer to use short-term debt maturity. 
 
 Johnson (2003) argues that firms that have 
greater net operating loss carryforwards tend to use 
short-term debt maturity. It means that there is a 
negative relationship between NOLs dummy and 
the debt maturity. If firms with NOLs have low tax 
benefits of debt, the negative coefficient will affect 
the debt maturity. 
 
 Barclay et al. (2003) state that optimal debt 
maturity should be longer for regulated firms 
because regulatory control restrict managers’ 
discretion over corporate investment decisions and 
thereby able to control aspects of underinvestment 
issues. The positive relationship between regulated 
dummy and debt maturity is also supported by 
Barclay and Smith (1995) who argue that regulated 
firms can borrow longer leverage due to less 
discretion in investment decision, and also less 
agency problem. Flannery (1986) argues that utility 
firms are expected to issue longer term debt 
maturity than other industrial firms.  
 
 Based on the signaling theory, companies 
with higher returns will give positive signal to the 
market. Hence, firms with positive information 
about future prospect prefer to use short-term debt 
that can be refinanced after information is revealed 
(Flannery, 1986). According to signaling theory, 
the selection of maturity structure selected by 
managers will provide useful information to 
investors.  
 
 This study also sees the relationship 
between asset maturities against debt maturity. If 
the debt has a maturity that is longer than the 
maturity of its assets, then there is a tendency for 
companies that do not have enough cash to pay 
debts until it matures. Conversely, if the debt has a 
maturity shorter than maturity of its assets, then 
companies which do not have enough funds will 
choose to refinance according to priority. This 
argument is supported by Myers (1977). This 
argument is also in line with Stohs and Mauer 
(1996) who assert that when debt maturity is 
shorter than asset maturity, the firm may not have 
sufficient cash to meet its obligations when they 
fall due; in other words, when the maturity of debt 
is longer than its asset maturity, the firm will have 
debt obligations to meet while cash flows from 
asset stop. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
tested that asset maturity has positive relationship 
with debt maturity. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Hypothesis 
 
Leverage Equation 
H1a 
Debt maturity has a positive effect on 
leverage  
H2 
Growth opportunities have a positive 
effect on leverage 
H3 Firm size has a positive effect on leverage 
H4 NOL has a negative effect on leverage 
H5 
Regulated firm has a positive effect on 
leverage 
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Table 1: Continued 
 
Leverage Equation 
H6 
Abnormal earnings has a positive effect 
on leverage 
H7 
Profitability (ROA) has a negative effect 
on leverage 
H8 
Tangibility has a positive effect on 
leverage 
Debt Maturity Equation 
H1b 
Leverage has a positive effect on debt 
maturity 
H9 
Growth opportunities have a negative 
effect on debt maturity 
H10 
Firm size has a positive effect on debt 
maturity 
H11 
NOL has a negative effect on debt 
maturity 
H12 
Regulated firm has a positive effect on 
debt maturity 
H13 
Abnormal earnings has a negative effect 
on debt maturity 
H14 
Asset maturity has a positive effect on 
debt maturity 
H15 
Term structure has a positive effect on 
debt maturity 
 
Source: Based on past related study 
 
 According to tax hypothesis, the firm’s 
debt maturity will increase with the slope of the 
yield and they are expected to have a positive 
relationship, which are supported by Barclay and 
Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996). Kim et 
al. (1995) state that the increase in the slope of 
term structure and the interest rate volatility can 
make firms to choose longer term debt maturity in 
their capital structure. Hence, term structure is 
expected to have a positive relationship to debt 
maturity. 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
 The financial data are obtained from 
DataStream and the industrial classifications are 
derived from Bursa Malaysia. The data for month-
end yields of Malaysian Government Securities 
(MGS) and Treasury-bills (T-bills) are sourced 
from the Bank Negara Malaysia’s website. The 
population of this study consists of companies 
listed on Bursa Malaysia from 1999 to 2010. The 
total number of listed companies is 850 from 12 
different industrial sectors, namely plantation, 
property, consumer, construction, trading/services, 
technology, mining, industrial products, hotels, 
infrastructure project, finance and Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs). 
 
 The sample is derived based on a 
purposive sampling technique. This technique is 
used to select the sample based on specific criteria 
and certain consideration adjusted to the purpose of 
study. The initial sample used in this study 
comprises of 850 companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. 
 
Table 2: List of Sample Data 
 
 
 
Source: Data stream 
 
 The target sample in this study must meet 
the following criteria: first, the companies are non-
financial firms listed on Bursa Malaysia; and 
second, the companies must have continuously 
published their financial reports from 1999 to 2010. 
A total of 51 firms in the financial sector are 
excluded because of their financial structures are 
likely to be influenced by different factors (e.g. 
capital adequacy regulations) than other non-
financial firms. In addition, 21 firms are excluded 
due to incomplete data. Therefore, the final sample 
size for this study consists of 778 listed firms (see 
Table 2). 
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3.1.  Analytical Techniques 
 This technique is used to test the 
simultaneity between leverage and debt maturity as 
the dependent variables in order to determine the 
relationship of the two policies and the independent 
variables such as growth opportunities, regulated 
firm, firm size, NOL carryforwards, abnormal 
earnings, profitability, tangibility, asset maturity, 
and term structure that affect leverage and debt 
maturity. The basic model of leverage and debt 
maturity equation is formulated as follows: 
  
 
 
Where:  
 
 
3.2  Variables 
 
 Based on the research problems and 
development of hypotheses, the variables that are 
examined in this study and their measurement are 
largely adopted from existing literature. The 
dependent variables are leverage and debt maturity; 
the explanatory variables include growth 
opportunity, regulated firms, firm size, NOLs, 
abnormal earnings, profitability, tangibility, asset 
maturity and term structure. The definition of these 
variables is listed in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Measurement of Variables 
 
Variables Measurement 
Dependent Variables 
Leverage Ratio of book value of total debt 
Variables Measurement 
to total asset 
Debt 
Maturity 
Ratio of long term debt to total 
debt 
Independent Variables 
 
Growth 
GROW is total asset plus market 
capitalization then minus 
common equity, divided by total 
asset. 
 
Regulated 
Firms 
The measurement of regulated 
firms are using dummy variable, 
1 for utilities companies and 
others are 0. 
 
Firm Size 
Measured by using the natural 
logarithm of total assets of each 
company 
 
Net 
Operating 
Loss 
NOL carryforwards dummy 
equals one form firms with net 
operating loss carry forwards and 
zero otherwise 
Abnormal 
Earnings 
The difference between earnings 
in year t+1 and t, then divided by 
earnings in year t. 
Profitability Ratio of EBITDA to total assets. 
Tangibility 
Ratio of tangible asset divides by 
total assets.  
Asset 
Maturity 
Ratio of fixed assets to annual 
depreciation expenses 
 
Term 
Structure 
The difference between the 
month end yields on long term 
10-year government bonds 
(MGS) and matched with the 
firm’s fiscal year end. 
 
Source: Secondary data that has been processed 
2012 
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
of Variables 
 
 Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for 
the entire sample which are used for the single 
equation and also simultaneous equations regression 
analysis. The data was analyzed by using Eviews 7, 
covering a total of 5721 observations. 
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 Mean (Median) leverage is 0.26 (0.24), it 
means that on average, Malaysian firms only use 
26.00% as leverage to finance their project. The 
mean for debt maturity is 0.39 which means that on 
average, the long term debt represent 39% of the 
total debt incurred by Malaysian firms. For growth 
opportunities, the mean is about 1.07, which 
signifies that investment opportunity is high in 
Malaysia. It is in line with a study conducted by 
Jensen (1986) which finds that firms with higher 
investment opportunity usually have high growth, 
active in investment, lower free cash flow and 
lower asset in place. 
 
The mean of regulated firm is 0.03 with 
standard deviation about 0.17 which signals that 
the distribution of data is not normal. This also 
means that the utility firms or other regulated firms 
in Malaysia is relatively fewer in number than non-
regulated firms. The abnormal earnings variables 
which are tested to see the signaling effect have an 
average  figure  of about 0.11  with  the  minimum 
value at -369.03 and the maximum value at 
110.96. This data shows abnormal distribution 
and can produce biased result as well. 
Meanwhile, the mean figure of ROA stands at 
3.94 with a standard deviation of 14.04, 
indicating that the firms are highlyprofitable. The 
average tangibility figure is 0.41 with a standard 
deviation of 0.21; this means that the data is 
normally distributed. 
 
 In addition, the means of asset maturity 
and term structure among Malaysian firms stand 
at 36.40 and 1.5 respectively. The high figure of 
asset maturity indicates that most Malaysian 
firms have lower depreciation on assets which 
implies that the firms have the ability to issue 
long-term debt maturity. Furthermore, the 
standard deviation of term structure is less than 
its average of about 0.93; it denotes that the 
lower the standard deviation from its average, 
the better the result will be since the data is 
normally distributed. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Entire Sample 
 
 
Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Obs 
Lev 0.2640 0.2357 10.273 0.0000 0.2872 5721 
DM 0.3890 0.3453 1.0000 0.0000 0.3130 5721 
GROW 1.0666 0.9090 19.101 0.2372 0.7579 5721 
SIZE 12.779 12.565 18.451 7.7098 1.3385 5721 
NOL 0.2381 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4259 5721 
REGUL 0.0295 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.1693 5721 
ABNR 0.1134 0.0269 110.96 -369.037 5.5641 5721 
ROA 3.9408 4.0800 771.45 -93.4700 14.038 5721 
TANG 0.4063 0.3976 0.9875 0.0000 0.2069 5721 
ASMAT 36.406 13.356 3352.4 -2142.26 112.99 5721 
SPRED 1.5143 1.2940 4.0550 0.0390 0.9313 5721 
 
Source: Secondary data that has been processed 2012 
 
Note: The number of observations is 5806 in 
Equation 1 and 6024 in Equation 2 consisting of the 
sample of listed companies during the 1999-2010 
periods. LEV is generated by dividing total debt to 
total asset. DM is long term debt divided by total 
debt. GROW is total asset plus market capitalization 
then minus common equity, divided by total asset. 
REGUL used a dummy variable, 1 for utilities 
companies and other are 0. SIZE is measured by log 
of total assets. NOL carryforwards dummy equalsto 
1 for net operating loss and 0 otherwise. ABNR is 
the difference between earnings in year t+1 and t, 
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then divided by earnings in year t. PROFIT is the 
ratio of EBITDA to total assets. TANG is 
tangible asset divide by total assets. ASMAT is 
the ratio of fixed assets to annual depreciation 
expenses. SPREAD is measured by the 
difference between the month-end yields on long 
term 10-year government bonds (MGS) and 
three-month Treasury-bills and matched with the 
firm’s fiscal year-end. 
 
Table 6 and 7 presents the correlation 
matrix among the variables in the leverage 
equation and debt maturity equation, 
respectively. These correlations express some 
simple relations among the variables before 
generating the simultaneous equations regression 
results. It can be seen in both tables that leverage 
and debt maturity are positively correlated and 
significant at 1% level.   
 
Table 6:  Correlation Matrix for Leverage 
 
LEV DM GROW SIZE NOL REGUL ABNR ROA TANG
LEV 1
----- 
DM 0.0392*** 1
(2.9920) ----- 
GROW 0.3562*** 0.0452*** 1
(29.0404) (3.4485) ----- 
SIZE 0.0261** 0.3614*** -0.0154 1
(1.9887) (29.5287) (-1.17) ----- 
NOL 0.1814*** -0.0673*** -0.0047 -0.1652*** 1
(14.0491) (-5.1364) (-0.3568) (-12.7585) ----- 
REGUL 0.0388*** 0.203618*** 0.0393*** 0.2900*** -0.0421 1
(2.957) (15.8444) (2.9993) (23.0870) (-3.2101) ----- 
ABNR 0.1165*** -0.0029 0.0787*** -0.0096 0.0127 0.0034 1
(8.9371) (-0.2175) (6.0153) (-0.7295) (0.9705) (0.2613) ----- 
ROA -0.2021*** 0.0609*** 0.1329*** 0.0813*** -0.2064*** 0.0252* -0.0083 1
(-15.7248) (4.6457) (10.2131) (6.2147) (-16.0712) (1.9198) (-0.6301) ----- 
TANG 0.0607*** 0.1812*** -0.0743*** 0.0693*** 0.004 0.0325** 0.006 -0.0565*** 1
(4.6301) (14.0353) (-5.6761) (5.2890) (0.3052) (2.4806) (0.4580) (-4.3094) ----- 
 
 
Source: Secondary data that has been processed 2012 
 
Note: The number of observations is 5275 consisting 
of the sample of listed companies during the 1999-
2010 period. LEV is generated by dividing total debt 
to total asset. DM is long-term debt divided by total 
debt. GROW is total asset plus market capitalization 
then minus common equity, divided by total asset. 
REGUL used dummy variable, 1 for utilities 
companies and other are 0. SIZE is measured by log 
of total assets. NOL carryforwards dummy equals 1 
for net operating loss and 0 otherwise. ABNR is the 
difference between earnings in year t+1 and t, then 
divided by earnings in year t. PROFIT is the ratio of 
EBITDA to total assets. TANG is tangible asset 
divided by total assets. 
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Table 7:  Correlation Matrix for Debt Maturity 
 
DM LEV GROW SIZE NOL REGUL ABNR ASMAT SPEARD
DM 1
----- 
LEV 0.0404*** 1
(3.1405) ----- 
GROW 0.0392*** 0.3410*** 1
(3.0437) (28.1456) ----- 
SIZE 0.3652*** 0.0323** -0.0280** 1
(30.439) (2.5043) (-2.1732) ----- 
NOL -0.0524*** 0.1804*** -0.0122 -0.1401*** 1
(-4.0683) (14.2349) (-0.9484) (-10.9827) ----- 
REGUL 0.2051*** 0.0411*** 0.0348*** 0.2931*** -0.0396** 1
(16.2583) (3.1921) -2.7045 -23.7877 (-3.0777) ----- 
ABNR 0.0089 0.1093*** 0.0672*** -0.0015 0.0065 0.0017 1
(0.6889) (8.5297) -5.223 (-0.1213) (0.5063) -0.1326 ----- 
ASMAT 0.1275*** -0.0119 -0.0693*** 0.0880*** 0.0429*** -0.0281** 0.2532*** 1
(9.9765) (-0.9253) (-5.3889) (6.8545) (3.3353) (-2.1812) -20.3117 ----- 
SPREAD -0.0328** -0.0004 0.0670*** 0.0006 -0.013 0.005 -0.0152 -0.0198 1
(-2.5477) (-0.0305) (5.2147) (0.0446) (-1.0097) -0.3845 (-1.1759) (-1.5354) ----- 
 
 
Source: Secondary data that has been processed 2012 
 
Note: The number of observations is 5275 consisting 
of the sample of listed companies during the 1999-
2010 period. LEV is generated by dividing total debt 
to total asset. DM is long-term debt divided by total 
debt. GROW is total asset plus market capitalization 
then minus common equity, divided by total asset. 
REGUL used dummy variable, 1 for utilities 
companies and other are 0. SIZE is measured by log 
of total assets. NOL carryforwards dummy equals 1 
for net operating loss and 0 otherwise. ABNR is the 
difference between earnings in year t+1 and t, then 
divided by earnings in year t. ASMAT is the ratio of 
fixed assets to annual depreciation expenses. 
SPREAD is measured by the difference between the 
month-end yields on long term of 10-
yearsgovernment bonds (MGS) and three-month 
Treasury-bills and matched with the firm’s fiscal year. 
 In addition, all variables are significantly 
correlated to the leverage at 1%level except for the 
asset maturity and term structure. Only ROA is found 
to have a significant negative relationship with 
leverage. Debt maturity is positively and statistically 
significant to the growth opportunities, size, regulated 
firm, ROA, tangibility and asset maturity at 1% level. 
However, theNOL carrryforwards is negative and 
significant to debt maturity at 1% level and term 
structure is also negatively significant to the debt 
maturity at 5% level. 
 
In this study also do some test like Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) that is used to detect the 
existence of the symptoms of multicollinearity 
between the explanatory variable. The result 
shows that there are no independent variables 
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that have VIF values greater than 10. Therefore, 
it is concluded that there is no multicollinearity 
between independent variables in both 
regression models. 
 
4.2. Regression Analysis 
 
 This study investigates empirically the 
relationship between leverage and debt maturity 
by using a simultaneous equations model on debt 
maturity and leverage for all sample panel data. 
This study also estimates a single equation 
without endogeneity and with endogeneity for 
both leverage and debt maturity using pooled 
EGLS with AR(1) to compare with previous 
studies. Estimation using EGLS will potentially 
reduce the number of observation since it is able 
to determine and adjust the data to be used. EGLS 
is also able to overcome the problem on 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation as evident 
from the Durbin-Watson analysis equals to 1.91 
for leverage and 2.12 for debt maturity. 
 
 The results of all regression analysis in 
Table 8 report that growth opportunity is 
significantly positive in all regression both in 
single and simultaneous equation to the leverage. 
It means that Malaysian firms which have high 
growth opportunity will take much more 
leverage in the determination of capital structure. 
However, the growth opportunity does not affect 
the determination of debt maturity. Thus, 
Malaysian firms cannot rely on growth 
opportunity in determining debt maturity. In 
sum, there is a relationship between leverage and 
growth opportunity as predicted, while on the 
other hand, growth opportunity does not 
significantly affect debt maturity and thus, the 
proposed hypothesis is rejected.   
 
 Regulated firm and firm size are 
statistically significant in both hypothesis of 
leverage and debt maturity either in single and 
simultaneous regression. This is in line with a 
study conducted by Barclay et al. (2003) and 
Johnson (2003). The positive relationship that 
exists between regulated firm and leverages is 
because regulated firms always maintain optimal 
leverage to reduce the agency risk (Bradley, Jarrell 
and Kim., 1984). While for maturity regression, 
positive coefficient at 1% level of significant 
which is in accordance to Barclay and Smith 
(1995) who state that regulated firm can borrow 
longer term debt due to less discretion in 
investment decision, and also less agency 
problems.  
 
 Furthermore, firm size is also positively 
significant in both regressions in accordance 
with the findings by Bevan and Danbolt (2002) 
and Barclay et al. (2003). All empirical studies 
suggest positive relation between firm sizes to 
leverage due to the fact that larger firms have 
smaller probability of facing bankruptcy thus 
allowing them to take higher leverage which 
also means having easy access to the bond 
market (Titman and Wessels, 1998) and (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995). Meanwhile, the 
relationship between debt maturity and firm size 
is positively significant. Positive effect of firm 
size, in accordance with the proposed 
hypothesis, and the results support the study 
conducted by Titman and Wessels (1998), 
Bevan and Danbolt (2000) and Barclay and 
Smith (1995).   
 
 While, for net operation loss 
carryforwards variable is positively significant to 
leverage but only significant in single equations. 
The positively significant relationship between 
net operating loss carryforwards and leverage 
contradicts with the predicted sign which is in 
line with studies by Barclay, Marx and Smith 
(1997) and Harris and Raviv (1991). It indicates 
that firms in Malaysia with higher net operating 
loss carryforwards will have higher leverage due 
to the losses generated by the net operating loss 
carryforwards which cause equity to fall in 
value. 
 
 Abnormal earnings have significant affect 
and the hypothesis is accepted but it contradicts 
with the predicted sign. In this study, negative 
relationship between abnormal earnings and 
leverage is supported by Muradoglu and 
Sivaprasad (2009). Thus, for Malaysian firms with 
higher abnormal earnings, they will use lower 
leverage, however the study by. 
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Table 8 : Three Different Estimators of LEV and DM Equation 
 
 
 
Source: Secondary data that has been processed 2012 
Standard errors in parentheses are for coefficient and P values for diagnostic test. ***,**,* Statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed test) 
 
 Modigliani and Miller (1958) find 
positively significant relationship only for utilities 
sectors. Therefore, it is possible for industry in 
Malaysia to have negative relationship between 
abnormal earnings and leverage. 
 
 On the other hand, debt maturity equation 
accepted the proposed hypothesis, which is in line 
with study conducted by Barclay and Smith (1995) 
and Sunarsih (2004) that argue abnormal earnings 
give good signal to the market which means that 
the firm is of good quality; more valuable firm will 
use more short term debt than long term debt.  
 
 As expected, profitability and tangibility 
are consistent and thus support the proposed 
hypothesis in leverage equation either in single or 
simultaneity regression. This is also in line with 
asset maturity which is consistent to proposed 
hypothesis and positively significant to debt 
maturity equation. Thus, Malaysian firms can take 
these three variables namely, profitability, 
tangibility and asset maturity into considerations 
in determining the level of debt in capital 
structure. 
  
 In addition, the result of term structure 
rejects the hypothesis in all regression, either in a 
single and simultaneous regression. Therefore, 
term structure cannot be used by Malaysian firms 
as a reference in determining the level of debt 
especially in debt maturity.  
 
 Lastly, for the simultaneity test, this 
study found that negative and statistically 
significant between leverage and debt maturity 
which is not in accordance with predicted 
sign.This may be due to leverage and maturity 
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are substitutes in addressing the under and over 
investment problems (Barclay et al., 2003). 
 
 Other explanations regarding discrepancy 
between the predicted sign and the result may also 
be due to the definition of long term debt adopted 
in this study in which it has no clear standard. 
According to Barclay et al. (2003), they state that 
measurements for debt maturity equal to the 
fraction of the firm’s total debt measured for more 
than 3 years. Whereas in this study, long term debt 
is a variable collected from Datastream with the 
terms of debt that have maturity of more than one 
year; this proportion is similar to short term debt by 
Johnson (2003), in which the proportion of debt 
matures within three years. Thus, it can be 
possible, that the long-term debt in this study 
comes under the category of short-term debt as 
used by Johnson (2003). 
 
 In Malaysia, most companies are using 
short-term debt maturity than long- term debt and 
only a few companies issue Sukuk (Mustapha, 
Ismail, &Minai, 2011). This also confirms the 
finding by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) 
that the most fundamental difference between 
developed and developing countries is that 
developing countries would prefer to use short term 
debt rather than using long term debt. So, note that 
there is possibility that the long term debt in this 
study is actually included in the category of short 
term debt as it stated by Johnson (2003).  
 
 On the basis of the above explanation, it is 
possible that the negative results obtained from this 
study are based on the factors that have been 
described. It is likely that this study supports the 
finding in Johnson (2003). Thus, the negative 
coefficient between debt maturity and leverage is 
consistent with Johnson (2003) in which higher 
leverage firms use lower short term debt to mitigate 
investment opportunity problems. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
 This study investigates empirically the 
relationship of simultaneity between leverage and 
debt maturity and factors that influence it, using a 
simultaneous equations framework in which 
leverage and debt maturity are endogenous. Based 
on the analysis of the results and discussion that 
have been described in the previous section, it can 
be concluded that results of this study indicate the 
presence of simultaneity between leverage and debt 
maturity with negative coefficient and significantly 
proven. This is shown by the negative sign on the 
variable leverage and debt maturity in both 
leverage and debt maturity equation. This shows 
that the relationship between leverage and debt 
maturity are complementary, which means there is 
a negative direction of the simultaneity relationship 
between the two equations. Thus, the coefficient 
estimated in an OLS regression of single equations 
will suffer from simultaneous equation bias. 
 
 In addition, this study does not include 
some exogenous variables used in the past studies, 
which are considered to have significant effects on 
the two policies. There are several variables that 
affect the leverage and debt maturity variables. As a 
recommendation for further research, adding some 
variables such as non-debt tax shield, dividend yield 
and covenants, could potentially increase the 
accuracy in analyzing the relationship of 
simultaneity between leverage and debt maturity. 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Table 9: Hypotheses Testing Summary 
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Table 9: Continued 
 
 
 
 
Source: Secondary data that has been processed 
2012 
 
Table 10 : Multicollinearity Test of LeverageEquation 
 
 
 
Source: Secondary data that has been processed 2012 
 
Table 11: Multicollinearity Test of Debt Maturity Equation 
 
 
 
Source: Secondary data that has been processed 2012 
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Table 12: Summaries of Prior Studies 
 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
Leverage                   
Debt Maturity             
M/B                                 
Regulation           
Firm Size                                 
Profitability (ROA)                     
Tangibility             
Effective Tax Rate           
NOL Dummy           
Volatility           
NDTS             
Abnormal Earning             
Asset Maturity                   
Commercial Paper Dummy       
Term Structure             
Liquidity     
Risk     
Authors/ Proxy Leverage Debt maturity
Simultaneity between 
leverage and debt maturity
Variables 
used
 
 
Source: Secondary data that has been processed 2012 
 
Note: This table shows the author of the previous 
research drawn at randomly in this study. They 
consist of: A. Rajan and Zingales. (1995), B = 
Titman, S., Wessels, R. (1998), C = Ozkan, A. 
(2002), D = Chen, J.J (2003), E = Jong, A.de. 
(2008), F = Barclay and Smith. (1995), G = Stohs 
and Mauer (1996), H = Guedes, J. and Opler, T. 
(1996), I = Jhonson, S.A. (1997), J = Stephen, A et 
al., (2011), K = Elyasiani, E et al., (2002), L = 
Barclay, M.J., et al., (2003), M = Johnson, S.A. 
(2003), N = Sunarsih. (2004), O = Fan, J., Titman, 
S., Twite, G. (2006). 
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